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2Reconstructing Female Emotionality
Abstract
I examine the use of emotion discourse in the management of blame and
accountability, using as an empirical case, the Panorama interview between Princess
Diana and Martin Bashir. Diana’s talk is examined to determine how she uses notions
of emotionality attributed to her in her discourse for accounting purposes. I argue that
Diana provides the background for her ‘emotional’ label and through doing so,
allocates blame by accusing the media and royal family of fabricating that label for
her. She further constructs their motive as being due to their being threatened by her
strength of character, rather than her perceived instability. Finally Diana reconstructs
her emotional nature into a positive attribute whilst marking the royal family as
‘unemotional’ and uncaring. This study is linked to a broader discursive psychology
of emotion concepts and their uses.
3Emotion discourse
This paper offers a discursive psychological study of the uses of emotion and
gendered concepts in accounting for actions and relationships.  Rather than studying
the ‘actual’ role of emotional states in relationships, as it is traditionally conceived, I
approach the issue as a discursive phenomenon (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Harré &
Gillett, 1994), produced as part of a narrative framework and utilised for accounting
purposes.
Emotion discourse is an important part of how social accountability is produced  (e.g.,
Lutz, 1988; White, 1990). More specifically, Buttny (1993) and Edwards (1997;
1999) have looked at emotion discourse in settings such as relationship counselling
and therapy and have found that emotion discourse forms an integral part of the
accounting process, either to imply that circumstances are problematic or out of the
ordinary, or in contrast to rational thought and in making narrative sense of people’s
actions.
I focus on Princess Diana and examine how she uses notions of emotionality
attributed to her to manage blame and accountability. Much research attention has
been paid to Diana and she has been discussed in the light of sexual politics
(Campbell, 1998); commented on for her ‘discourses of the heart’ ( Heelas, 1999);
constructed as a ‘media saint’ (Richards, Wilson & Woodhead, 1999) and examined
for her negotiation of blame and implication in the Panorama interview (Abell &
Stokoe, 1999; Bull, 1997). Other research work has focused on the period following
Diana’s death and examined the ‘grieving of the nation’ (Anderson & Mullen, 1998)
and analysed the allocation of blame to the paparazzi for her death (Macmillan &
Edwards, 1999). This paper differs by looking at how emotion discourse forms an
integral part of the accounting structure for Diana in the Panorama interview and
examines how the gendered constructions of female emotionality can be reconstructed
in order to fulfil rhetorical purposes.
Gender and emotion
This paper takes the issue of gendered emotion as its topic and I argue that emotion
discourse and concepts can be used rhetorically and indexically to construct versions
of character. There is strong evidence for constructed gendered perceptions of
4emotionality and in particular, the stereotypical view of female emotionality. In terms
of feminist thought, the gender differences that appear in emotionality can be seen as
being due to cultural expectations of emotional expression and long-held stereotypical
notions of ‘emotional female’ and ‘non-emotional male’. This position proposes that
emotionality is culturally coded as feminine, whereas rationality is coded as
masculine (Lupton, 1998), and that masculine identity is bound up with restrictive
emotionality (Jansz, 2000). The gendered aspects of emotional experience are clear
and the traditional stereotypes of emotional female versus non-emotional male are
culturally evident and endorsed (Fischer, 1993; Lupton, 1998; Lutz, 1990). The
construct of females as emotional is a taken for granted assumption which can be hard
to undermine, as Shields and Crowley note:
“Stereotypic representations of the emotional female / unemotional male are so prominent in North
American culture that these stereotypes reinforce the notion that the starting point for any gendered-
based analysis of emotion should be gender differences in emotion”. (Shields & Crowley, 1996: 219,
their emphasis).
Although historically these viewpoints have been held, recently such gender
stereotypes may have ‘softened’. However, as Fivush and Buckner (2000) note:
“Although the traditional stereotype of the weeping female and the stoic male have softened somewhat
over the past twenty years (Basow, 1992), one of the strongest stereotypes related types related to
gender continues to centre on emotionality” (Fivush and Buckner, 2000: 234).
Why are women culturally constructed as more emotional than men? The answer may
lie in the expression of emotion, and a number of studies back up this position. For
example, Fischer (1993) proposed that women are more willing to talk about and
express emotions than men. Brody (2000) found that display rules of emotion
generally conform to gender stereotypes. Similarly, Van-Leeson, Todd and Parkinson
(1998) found the regulation of emotions to be consistent with gender emotion norms.
Furthermore they argue that both men and women use discourses of masculinity,
femininity, and biology when discussing emotion and behaviour, such that these folk
notions of gendered emotion are evident in people’s talk. Fischer (1993) argues that
emotionality should not be considered one of the basic dimensions to distinguish the
sexes, and that the “claim that women are more emotional than men tells us more
5about our cultural stereotypes than about actual sex differences in emotions”.
(Fischer, 1993: 312).
With regards to the non-verbal expression of emotion, numerous research has been
conducted to ascertain if these gendered assumptions hold some water or basis in
‘fact’. Hall (1984) conducted a meta-analysis of facial expressiveness and found that
females were more facially expressive than men. However, in more recent work, Hall,
Carter and Horgan note that “non-verbal behavior does not necessarily signify
emotion” (Hall, Carter & Horgan, 2000: 97). Although such non-verbal studies are of
interest in the larger issue of gender and emotion, the purpose of this paper is to focus
on the discursive uses of emotionality as they occur at local, interactional levels and
examined for their role in accounting for, and constructing events.
Dispositional emotionality
Emotionality is in itself a value based judgment, whether people use it to explain their
own behaviour (emotional ‘avowal’) or, as it seems most often to be used in this
gendered context, in describing other people (emotional ‘ascription’). The latter case
is often used in constructions of women, and its generally negative value is closely
associated with its gendered character (Shields, 1991).
Rhetorically, emotion concepts can be used in many differing ways (Edwards, 1997;
1999). What is of interest here is the contrast between ‘reactive’ emotion and
dispositional emotion. Reactive emotion refers to being emotional in a particular
situation where the emotion is produced as an understandable reaction to a specific
event or object. Dispositional emotionality however removes this situational element
and is treated as a uni-polar personality trait that is stable over time and neglects to
take into account the social and cultural contexts of emotion (Fischer, 1993).  Being
dispositionally emotional allows a number of other categories to be inferred and
attached to the label, most notably notions of irrationality, as emotion is typically
contrasted with rational thought, and instability. Thus to ascribe dispositional
emotionality to a person can be a way to blame them for their actions, while managing
your own accountability (cf. Edwards, 1994; 1995 on the uses of ‘script and
disposition’ formulations in relationship counselling).
6In looking at emotionality, the notion that females are more emotional than males is
so ingrained in our cultural beliefs that it is hard to dismantle this myth as a social
construction.  As Shields and Crowley note “[ i]n so far as they are foundational to our
understanding of emotion, we may not even recognise them as beliefs, but rather
revere them as reality” (Shields & Crowley, 1996: 223).
The rhetoric of control
Emotion is seen to weaken the person who experiences it and being ‘too emotional’ is
seen as a character deficit. Emotion is culturally linked with gender and power and in
terms of emotional expression there is a rhetoric of control (Lutz, 1990). There is a
shared cultural view that emotions, if not controlled, can be dangerous.  Yet, as
Catherine Lutz notes, the culturally constructed emotionality of women has a number
of contradictions.  On the one hand she is pliant and weak, and on the other she is
potentially dangerous, powerful and uncontrollable (Lutz, 1990).  The corollary of
emotional weakness is an elevation of social status for those who have the ability to
control their emotions (Lutz, 1990; Parrott, 1995), and most commonly this is seen to
be a male characteristic. ‘Being emotional’ is seen as not being in control of your
emotions (Parrott, 1995), and thus perhaps acting irrationally.  Therefore to construct
someone as emotional is a way of apportioning blame for their actions, and negativity
to their character or disposition. However, rhetorically there is another construction
here that being unemotional, cold or aloof is seen as a negative characteristic. As the
analysis will demonstrate, Diana constructs her emotionality as justified and reactive
against the problematic, unemotional nature of the royal family.
The rhetoric of emotion (Lutz, 1990) suggests a set of roles and here is where the
gendered aspects become most apparent, as does the negotiation of power. As
Kenneth Gergen has noted: “[ e]motion terms are socially and politically loaded”
(Gergen, 1999: 108), in that emotionality is used as a subtle and indirect means of
evaluating a person. Gergen cites examples of common binaries in western society,
for example: ‘rational versus emotional’, ‘effective versus ineffective’, and ‘strong
versus weak’, and notes the imbalance provided in the binaries, arguing that the
former term is often privileged over the latter, i.e. it is deemed to be better to be
rational rather than emotional. These binaries are often used in depictions of gender
with men being associated with the privileged terms.  Lutz makes a similar point, that
7“qualities that define the emotional, also define women. For this reason, any discourse
on emotion is also, at least implicitly, a discourse on gender” (Lutz, 1990: 151).
Emotionality and its colluders
As mentioned, emotionality as a concept brings with it, by implication, other notions
such as irrationality and instability that are attached to the person with the emotional
label (Fischer, 1993; Locke & Edwards, forthcoming).  What these colluders, as I
have termed them here, do interactionally is to strengthen the impact of emotionality
as a label, and make it more of a blaming and accounting device. In the analysis
offered here, Princess Diana was labelled as highly emotional and mentally
imbalanced.  This may come as no surprise, given that some feminist researchers
argue that women are expected to be unstable and out of control (Burns, 1992).
Interactionally the use of emotional labels is crucial. At one level it serves to dismiss
or downgrade the opinions of the emotional person, accounting for them as
irrationally grounded and explained away.  At a more extreme level it enables us to
create a notion of the emotional woman as being mentally ill.  Jane Ussher notes:
“To pathologize the individual woman is to neutralize her as a threat to the dominant order. There is no
need to look to society  - to men - to political factors to understand and ameliorate her situation. There
is no need to heed her comments or her complaints, her cries for help. Everything she has previously
experienced can be seen as part of her pathology, and her previous life rewritten to fit the psychiatric
scenario” ( Ussher, 1991: 177).
Accountability of emotionality
As the literature under discussion has demonstrated, there is a well-established
cultural construction of emotionality and gender. This takes many forms from
stereotypical notions of emotion, emotionality and expression of emotion and the
rhetoric of control, to the pathologizing of women.
Being emotional is an accountable matter and, as I argue throughout this article, a
means of accomplishing blaming of the person for their actions. As Lutz (1990) and
Gergen (1999) have noted, avowals and ascriptions of emotionality can be considered
a means of negotiating power, as emotion is gendered against the female with
8rationality held as the desired state in western culture, over emotionality. Perhaps
then, examining uses of emotion language is a way in to examining the power
differentials within a gender driven interaction. Thus although emotion discourse may
be a means of locating power in interactions within a discursive framework, to
perhaps blame or make a person accountable, it can also work in a contrary way, to
excuse or explain the behaviour and action of the emotional person as being
situationally caused rather than personally, and dispositionally, attributable.
One of the pragmatic virtues of emotion concepts, in everyday talk, is their surprising
flexibility in managing blame and accountability for actions (Edwards, 1997, 1999).
In terms of (constructed) power relations, emotionality can be used to blame or
discredit, but also to justify and account for actions, or in the case of the analysis
offered here, can be reconstructed as a positive attribute to possess, while marking the
‘unemotional’ as problematic. This paper demonstrates that Diana does so by
rhetorically marking her emotional expression as understandable and positioning the
royal family’s restrictive emotional nature as strange. The argument pursued through
the paper makes no claims as to the ‘realities’ of emotionality between genders, rather
it treats labels of emotionality as constructions designed to perform interactional
business. Thus the issue here moves away from ‘real’ gendered differences in
emotions to examining common-sense notions of emotion and gender, and how they
are worked up and put to work in discourse.
Method
The material used in this study was the interview between Princess Diana and Martin
Bashir, which was broadcast on the BBC’s ‘Panorama’ programme on 20 th November
1995. The programme was video-recorded and transcribed using conventions
established for conversation analysis by Gail Jefferson (see Atkinson & Heritage,
1984), which are summarized in Appendix 1. The resulting transcript was analysed
using a discursive approach that draws upon both discursive psychology (Edwards &
Potter, 1992) and conversation analysis (Sacks, 1992)
The transcript was read repeatedly in conjunction with the video data, and sections
relevant to the analysis of emotion terms and events were identified and coded as
9pertaining to one or more of three emerging analytic themes: (1) accounting for the
emotional label; (2) blaming others for the label; and lastly, (3) reconstructing the
emotional label into a positive attribute. It is a feature of the discourse deployed here,
that these themes overlap and the two extracts used to demonstrate the analysis,
contain a number of these overlapping themes.
Analysis
I focus on the reflexive implications, for her own character, role and motives, of
Diana. However, the analysis offered here neither endorses nor opposes any particular
version of her situation but, rather, examines Diana’s descriptions within a specific
discourse setting, for the kinds of interactional and rhetorical work that those
descriptions perform.  That ‘work’ is performed locally by the details of talk, but
attends to general concerns of the interaction as a whole.
Theme 1: Accounting for the emotional label
Prior to the following extract, Diana has been discussing the royal family’s reaction to
the birth of William, and the relief that Diana had a boy. She goes on to discuss her
post-natal depression that she attributes to working too hard in her role as Princess of
Wales, and needing to rest. Bashir establishes that this depression was out of character
for the Princess and as this analysis will go on to show, his corroboration here with
Diana is crucial in order to dismiss claims of her being dispositionally emotional and
unstable. Extract one focuses on how the royal family reacted to Diana’s post-natal
depression.
Extract One: Panorama MB/Diana: 5 (0:10)
1 MB: what was the (.) the family’s reaction to your
2 post-natal depress↓ion
3 Diana: well maybe I was the first person ever to be in
4 this family (0.8) who ever (0.4) had a depression
5 (.) or was ever openly tearful (.) .hh (.) and
6 obviously that was daunting because if you’ve never
7 seen it before how do you support it
8 (2.5)
9 MB: what effect (.) did the depression have on your
10
10 marriage
11 (1.2)
12 Diana: well it gave everybody (0.2) a wonderful (0.2) new
13 label (0.2) (it’s) Diana’s (.) unstable (.) and
14 Diana’s um (0.2) mentally imbalanced (.) and
15 unfortunately that seems to have stuck on and off
16 over the years
17 (1.0)
18 MB: are you saying (.) that that label stuck within
19 your marriage?
20 (0.8)
21 Diana: I think people used it (.) and it stuck (0.2) °yes°
Bashir asks for the “family’s” reaction to her post-natal depression (lines 1-2). Diana
seemingly offers reasons as to why the royal family reacted the way they did, but this
construction of them here makes possible reflexive constructions of Diana later on in
the interview, and this is something that will be examined later on in this paper. She
proposes that perhaps she was the “first person ever…in this family” (lines 3-4) to
suffer depression. She uses the extreme case formulations (Pomerantz, 1986) of
“ever” throughout this turn in line 3, line 4 “who ever ..had a depression”, and line 5
“ever openly tearful”, to build up the extremity of the situation described. Extreme
case formulations are used in rhetorical environments of this kind, in making
contested events accountable (Pomerantz, 1986). Diana’s extreme account perhaps
can be heard as ironic (Edwards, 2000), in that it seems implausible that she could be
the first person to have cried in front of others in the royal household. However, rather
than ironical, it may serve to construct or conjure the long-established unemotional
nature of the royal family. This is the first step to reconstructing her ‘emotionality’
from a dispositional weakness or character deficit to focusing on the impassive and
problematically nature of the unemotional royal family.
Diana is apparently proposing that it was not the family’s fault that they reacted in the
way they did, because they simply did not or could not understand how she felt. This
is a crucial rhetorical move for her as she constructs the “famil y” as not understanding
what is a common condition, and not being able to cope with overt expressions of
emotion. She bolsters this notion of outward expression (of emotion) in lines 5-7, that
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she may have been the first person who “was ever openly tearful”. An interesting part
of Diana’s account is how in line 4 she labels her condition “depression” and then
produces a description of emotional behaviour that in folk logic, accompanies this
condition being “openly tearful” (line 5).
Theme 2: Blaming others for her label
Bashir asks Diana what effect “the depression” (lines 9-10) had on her marriage. Note
here his use of “the depression” as her condition rather than focusing on her emotional
reactions, which endorses her description of her condition as medical and
understandably caused, rather than stemming from some kind of deep rooted personal
instability.
Diana’s turn starting at line 12 blames “everybody” for the “ wonderful…new label”
that came out of this depression, that Diana was “unstable” (line 13) and “mentally
imbalanced” (line 14), and again her use of language here is hearably ironic
(‘wonderful’).  She comments that this label had “unfortunately... stuck on and off
over the years” (lines 15-16). Diana’s account of how labels got ascribed to her is a
demonstration of emotionality and its colluders. She was understandably, reactively,
“openly tearful”, but this got turned, via a series of inappropriate attributions, to
notions of instability and mental imbalance.
Bashir asks Diana for validation of what she is implying in lines 18-19, when he asks
if the label had stuck “within your marriage?”, which is an indirect way of asking
whether Charles himself believed her to be unstable or, by implication, treated her as
such.  Diana’s response in line 21 blames a generalised “people” for using the label
and then reiterates that the label had stuck, followed by a softly and quietly spoken
“°yes°” to answer Bashir’s question that the label stuck in her marriage.  In other
words, while aligning with Bashir’s delicacy in not mentioning Charles directly in an
accusatory manner, we are to understand that Charles colluded in this construction of
her as unstable. In addition, her claims of the label having “stuck” does some
interesting narrative sequence where it appears that it is the consistency of the use of
the label, rather than Diana’s distress that is used to explain the label’s persistence.
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Extract one is an account of where, according to Diana, her misperceived instability
and emotionality arose from – a medical condition of post-natal depression that the
family failed to understand. In addition, her construction of the royal family not
knowing how to react to her being tearful and depressed, signifies a problem with the
family itself, rather than her.  They appear to have some difficulty with emotional
expression, and perhaps are abnormal in this respect. Lastly, Diana suggests that the
emotional and unstable label was “used” (line 21) by members of the royal family,
including Charles.
Theme 3: Reconstructing the emotional label
The second extract from Diana follows on from a discussion between Diana and
Bashir as to whether she would ever be queen.  Diana answers that the
“establishment” had previously decided that she was a “non-starter” for that position,
and that she wanted to be a “queen of people’s hearts”.  This notion of her being a
“queen of hearts” builds upon her construction in extract one of the royal family as
unemotional, or as having difficulty with emotional expression, and thus being
perhaps in need of someone to play such a role in the nation’s hearts.
Extract Two: Panorama MB/Diana: 21 (0: 49)
1 MB: why do you think they’ve decided that
2 Diana: .hhhh because I do things differently (0.2) because
3 I don’t go by a rule book .hh (.) because (0.2) I
4 lead from the heart not the head (0.4) and albeit
5 that’s got me into trouble in my work I understand
6 th↑at (0.4) but s↑omeone’s got to go out there and
7 love people (0.2) and show it.
8 (0.8)
9 MB: and do you think that (.) because of the way you
10 (0.2) behave (.) that’s (.) precluded you
11 effectively from becoming (.) queen
12 Diana: yes I- (.) >well not<  precluded me I wouldn’t (.)
13 say that (.) .hh u:m (.) I just don’t think I have
14 as many supporters in that environment than I did
15 (.) I did yeah
16 MB: you mean within the royal household=
17 Diana: =mm hm (0.2) mm (1.2) they see me as a (0.2) a
18 threat of some kind (0.4) and I’m here to do good
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19 (.) not to d- I’m not a destructive person
20 MB: why (.) do they see you as a threat
21 Diana: I think every strong woman in history has had to
22 walk down a similar path (.) and I think (.) it’s
23 the strength (.) that causes the confusion and the
24 fear.
Bashir asks Diana why she thinks that the royal family regard her as a non-starter.
Diana claims that she does things differently (from them, implicationally), that she
does not follow a rule book and finally she replies again in emotion metaphorical
terms, that she leads from “the h eart not the head” (line 4). The distinction between
heart and head is a metaphorical construction for emotional versus rational, and by her
implication, that emotional is more desirable. This claim is made possible through her
construction of the royal family in extract one as being, contrastively to her,
unemotional, and gives further claim to her wishing to be a “queen of people’s
hearts”. Thus to recap on the notion of emotionality and its discursive uses, Diana has
turned the rhetorical tables on her accusers, proposing that it is the royal family who
do not understand emotions and feelings, with their over-emphasis on the “h ead” to
the neglect of the “h eart”.
Diana goes further, arguing that her willingness to lead emotionally from the “h eart”
has got her “into trou ble in my work” (line 5), but then removes her own
accountability from this by going on to say “but s ↑omeone’s got to go out there and
love people and show it” (lines 6-7).  This is a rhetorical move from her and bolsters
her existing construction of herself as emotional because people need her to “love”
them and to “show it”. Again this implies a kind of royal job vacancy ,  that this role
needed to be fulfilled by someone royal, but that the royals either could not or would
not express their emotions to “people”.  Note how Diana manages her stake here, a
stake arising from her own candidature for that role (cf. Edwards & Potter, 1992), by
using the expression “s ↑omeone” in line 6 rather than ‘I’, implying that the need for
such a role was independent of her, that anyone might have fulfilled it, except that she
happened to be in a position, and with the required attributes, to do it herself.  The
reflexive implications concerning her own character are evident here.  It bolsters her
characterization as the caring, emotionally uninhibited “queen of hearts”, again in
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rhetorical contrast to the deficits of a royal family dispositionally unable to fulfil that
essential role.  In addition, through Diana’s delicate management of stake (lines 6-7),
it closes off another line of inference that one may make about emotionally intense
individuals, that they are narcissistically fulfilling their own ambitions in their
dealings with others. She stepped into this role off loving ‘others’ rather than being
‘loved’ or basking in publicity.
Bashir goes on to ask Diana if her behaviour may have precluded her from becoming
queen (lines 9-11).  This question about her behaviour could be problematic, in that it
could imply that Diana’s behaviour was wrong and that she is accountable for this.
Diana’s answer in lines 12-15 sidetracks that issue, replying that her behaviour did not
in itself preclude her, but that she did not have the support in the environment that she
previously had.  Bashir in line 16 asks her to clarify whom she means by the
“environment” and suggests to her (again somewhat delicately, without naming
names) that it may be the “royal household”. Diana answers with an account as to
why she no longer has this support (lines 17-18). Note here that the issue of Diana’s
behaviour and emotionality is not picked up by her now, rather she focuses on the
impression of others about her.
Diana turns her focus to others’ impressions of her. Her construction here is that the
establishment see her as a threat. She states that she is not a “des tructive person” (line
19) and wants to do good. Her statement is in line with folk notions of gendered
emotion with women seen as emotional and weak, yet with the potential to be
uncontrollable and dangerous (Lutz, 1990).
Bashir questions why Diana believes that the royal family would consider her to be a
threat (line 20). Her answer positions her as part of a gender specific generalized
category  - “every strong woman in history” (line 21), and here she is aligning herself
with other women, and specifically with women who are strong leaders, thereby
constructing herself also as strong in direct relation to the weak, emotional and
imbalanced character that has been constructed through the media by the
‘establishment’. Such claims of embracing emotionality as a positive characteristic
are evident in ‘difference’ or ‘celebratory’ feminism (e.g. Miller, 1976)
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Diana goes further to argue that it is in fact the strength of her character that “causes
the confusion and the fear” (lines 22-24), once again in some group of un-named, but
inferrable people. Here again she has turned around the issue of her being emotional
and weak, to her being strong, and the others (the royals) feeling confused and afraid
because of this. The implication is that they are the emotionally weak and irrational
ones, reinforcing Diana’s construction of them as unable to express themselves, and
now feeling threatened because of her contrastively normal, even laudable openness.
Conclusions
I have approached the issue of female emotionality from the perspective of discursive
psychology (cf. Edwards, 1999) focusing on Princess Diana. As the analysis of
Diana’s talk demonstrates, to be portrayed as emotional can bring with it connotations
of instability and irrationality.  I have argued that such labels are highly gendered and
can be used as part of a set of blaming practices, making persons accountable for their
actions.  Yet these labels can also be reconstructed, as the example of Diana shows, in
how she was able to reconstruct the label positively and invert the emotional
pathology onto her accusers.  The start point for that inversion was her attribution of
her open tearfulness to a documented medical condition of post-natal depression,
rather than a feature of her character or personality.
Diana went on to contrast her (now normal and understandable) emotional states to
those of the strangely non-emotional royal family, and builds a basis for her identity
as the queen of hearts; she leads from the heart and not the head.  Her emotionality is
thus reconstructed as a positive aspect of her character (character and disposition now,
not just a symptom of post-natal depression), and she claims that it is in fact the royal
family who have the emotional problem of not being able or willing to express their
feelings. Finally, when asked why the royal family turned on her and gave her this
emotional label, she claims that they feared her due to her strength of character, and
aligns herself with ‘other’ strong women in history.
In terms of emotion discourse generally, there are a number of theoretical
implications of emotionality as a discursive construct and it can be used in a number
of ways:
1.  Emotionality can be used discursively to undermine a person’s credibility, and
to build dispositional elements of character. Such uses of emotionality are based
16
on well-documented gender stereotypes (e.g. Lupton, 1998; Shields & Crowley,
1996).
2. However, as this paper demonstrates, the rhetorical uses of emotion allows for
many flexible uses of emotion concepts (Edwards, 1997; 1999) and emotionality
can be reconstructed by the speaker to be a positive and ‘caring’ element of
character. Such a rhetorical use of emotionality as positive can invert
negative attributions made by other persons, and  re-assign negative
characteristics to them, in particular the problematic issue of their lack of emotion.
The analysis of the late Princess of Wales has served to demonstrate both the
interactional currency of gendered stereotypes of emotionality, and the rhetorical uses
that may be deployed in order to counteract such claims.
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Appendix 1:  Transcription Symbols
These are derived from the system developed mainly by Gail Jefferson for
conversation analysis (see also Atkinson & Heritage, 1984).
[   ] Square brackets mark the start and end of overlapping speech.
↑ ↓ Vertical arrows precede marked pitch movement.
Underlining signals emphasis; the extent of underlining within individual
words locates emphasis, but also indicates how heavy it is.
CAPITALS mark speech that is obviously louder than surrounding speech.
o↑I know it,o Raised circles (‘degree’ signs) enclose obviously quieter
speech.
 (0.4) Numbers in round brackets measure pauses in seconds (in this
case, 4 tenths of a second)
(.) A micropause, hearable but too short to measure.
she wa::nted Colons show degrees of elongation of the prior sound; the more
colons, the more elongation.
hhh Aspiration (out-breaths); proportionally as for colons.
.hhh Inspiration (in-breaths).
Yeh, Commas mark weak rising intonation, as used sometimes in
enunciating lists.
y’know? Question marks signal stronger, ‘questioning’ intonation,
irrespective of grammar.
Yeh. Periods (stops) mark falling, stopping intonation, irrespective
of grammar.
bu-u- hyphens mark a cut-off of the preceding sound.
>he said< ‘greater than’ and ‘lesser than’ signs enclose speeded-up talk.
solid.= We had ‘Equals’ signs mark the immediate ‘latching’ of successive
talk, whether of one or more speakers, with no interval.
(...) This shows where some talk has been omitted from a data
extract or from within a turn at speaking.
